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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), and transferred it to this Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). Jurisdiction in this Court is pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(j) by transfer from the Supreme Court. 
ISSUE FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly rule, as a matter of law, that Mr. York failed to 
file his complaint within the four year statute of limitations and that U.C.A. Section 78-
12-35 did not toll the limitations period as Mr. Gardiner was at all times amenable to 
personal jurisdiction within the State of Utah? This issue is reviewed for correctness, 
affording no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law. See Alder v. Bayer Corp., 
61 P.3d 1068, 1075 (Utah 2002). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25, entitled "Within four years," provides, 
in relevant part: 
An action may be brought within four years: 
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3). 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35, entitled "Effect of absence from state," 
provides in full: 
1 
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of 
the state, the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this 
chapter after his return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues he 
departs from the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for 
the commencement of the action. 
U.C.A. §78-12-35. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: 
Plaintiff Mr. York is the president of Interport, Inc. ("Interport"), a company 
that imports firearms into the United States. (R.10.) Defendant Mr. Gardiner is an 
attorney practicing law in Fairfax, Virginia. (See id.) On two separate occasions in the 
mid-1990's, Mr. Gardiner was engaged by Interport to represent it in two lawsuits 
involving Interport's importation of machine guns into the United States. (See id) While 
Mr. York was actively involved in both lawsuits as a representative of Interport, Mr. York 
was not a party to either of the two lawsuits and Mr. Gardiner was never engaged to 
represent Mr. York's separate individual interests. (See id.) Mr. Gardiner's 
representation of Interport came to an end no later than February of 2000. (See id.) 
Despite the fact that Mr. Gardiner never represented Mr. York in any 
individual capacity, and while there was no attorney-client relationship between Mr. York 
and Mr. Gardiner, Mr. York filed breach of contract and legal malpractice claims against 
Mr. Gardiner in Utah's Fourth Judicial District Court. (See id.) Mr. York did not file his 
complaint until April 12, 2005. (R.l-6.) 
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In response to Mr. York's complaint, Mr. Gardiner filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment which challenged Mr. York's claims on Iwo points. (R.9-23.) First, 
Mr. Gardiner argued that because there was no contract or attorney-client relationship 
between Mr. Gardiner and Mr. York, Mr. Gardiner owed no duty to Mr. York and Mr. 
York had no standing to bring breach of contract and legal malpractice claims against Mr. 
Gardiner. (See icL) Second, Mr. Gardiner argued that Mr. York's claims were barred by 
the four year statute of limitations. (See id.) 
The trial court initially granted Mr. Gardiner's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on the issue of duty and standing, but denied the motion as to the statute of limitations.1 
(R. 128-42.) Following the filing of a motion to reconsider and clarify, the trial court 
granted the motion and ruled that Mr. Gardiner was entitled to summary judgment on the 
basis of the statute of limitations. (R.233-35.) Mr. York only appeals the trial court's 
decision on the statute of limitations issue. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
Mr. York filed his Civil Complaint in Utah's Fourth Judicial District Court on 
April 12, 2005. (R.l.) The Honorable Judge Donald J. Eyre was assigned to the case. 
(R.l.) Mr. Gardiner filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on July 15, 2005 on the 
1
 The trial court's initial decision provided that although Interport had failed to 
properly assign its alleged breach of contract and legal malpractice claims against Mr. 
Gardiner to Mr. York, Interport could still make such an assignment which Interport, 
through Mr. York, proceeded to do. Hence, whether the claims are barred by the statute 
of limitations applies to Interport's assigned claims. 
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issues of duty, standing and the four year statute of limitations. (R.7-63.) Mr. York 
opposed the Motion for Summary Judgment by way of an opposition brief.2 (R.85.) The 
trial court held oral argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment on October 25, 
2005.3 (R.126.) On November 29, 2005, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision 
granting Mr. Gardiner's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issues of duty and 
standing, but denying the motion as to the statute of limitations. (R.128.) 
On December 5, 2005, Mr. York filed a pleading entitled "Addendum To: 
Motion to Disqualify, Affidavit of Bias & Prejudice & Certificate of Good Faith" in 
which he argued, for a second time, for the recusal of Judge Eyre. (R.144.) On 
December 7, 2005, Judge Eyre ruled that while he "had previously thought he was not 
biased or prejudiced against the plaintiff, William York, given the very personal, mean 
spirited and false allegations made by the plaintiff in his recently filed Addendum, the 
Court believes that it can not now put aside those allegations and not be affected by what 
appears to be the personal animosity that Mr. York appears to have against the Court." 
2
 In addition, on August 2, 2005, Mr. York filed a "Motion to Intervene" in which 
he informed the trial court that the subject case was related to another pending case in 
which Mr. Gardiner had filed suit to recover his unpaid legal fees from Interport. (R.64-
65.) It was unclear what relief Mr. York sought as part of this Motion. In any event, 
while it was opposed by Mr. Gardiner, it was never submitted to the trial court for 
decision and was therefore never determined by the trial court. 
3
 Immediately prior to the hearing, Mr. York also filed a "Motion to Disqualify, 
Affidavit of Bias & Prejudice & Certificate of Good Faith" in which he sought to 
disqualify Judge Eyre on the basis that he was biased against Mr. York. (R. 109.) 
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(R.155.) The case was then transferred to the Honorable Judge Fred D. Howard on 
December 15, 2005. (R.159.) 
On December 23, 2005, Mr. Gardiner filed a Motion to Reconsider and/or 
Clarify in which he asked the trial court, inter alia, to reconsider the ruling regarding the 
statute of limitations. (R. 165.) Mr. York did not respond to the motion in any way and 
Mr. Gardiner filed a Request to Submit for Decision on January 19, 2006. (R.231.) On 
February 16, 2006, the trial court entered a Ruling Re: Defendant's Motion to Reconsider 
and/or Clarify in which it granted Mr. Gardiner summary judgment on the statute of 
limitations. (R.233.) An order entitled Judgment of Dismissal was submitted to the Court 
and was signed on March 14, 2006. (R.239.) 
On March 13, 2006, Mr. York filed a pleading entitled Request for Due 
Process & Constitutional Rights in which he argued that he should have been accorded a 
hearing on Mr. Gardiner's Motion to Reconsider and/or Clarify. (R.237.) Mr. York also 
filed a Motion for Default Judgment on March 13, 2006, in which he argued that he was 
entitled to a default judgment because Mr. Gardiner had not filed an answer to his 
complaint. (R.242.) Mr. Gardiner responded to both of these motions, but they were 
never submitted to the trial court for decision and were therefore never ruled upon by the 
trial court. Mr. Gardiner next filed his Notice of Appeal on April 12, 2006. (R.266.) 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT: 
All of Mr. York's claims against Mr. Gardiner were dismissed as a matter of 
law in a Judgment of Dismissal signed March 14, 2006. (R.239.) A copy of the 
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Judgment of Dismissal is attached hereto as Appendix A. Mr. Gardiner appeals the trial 
court's Judgment of Dismissal as it relates to the trial court's determination that the 
statute of limitations bars his claims. (See App. Br. pp. 2-8.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Gardiner is an attorney who resides and practices in Fairfax, 
Virginia. (R.l.) 
2. Interport is a Nevada Corporation. Mr. York is the President of 
Interport. (R.26.) 
3. The primary business of Interport is importing firearms and firearm 
parts into the United States. (R.28.) 
A. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAWSUIT: 
4. In May of 1986, Interport submitted forms to the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF") seeking to register 911 Sten machine guns so they could 
be sold privately without certain restrictions required by federal law. (R.36.) In October 
of 1986, the ATF informed Interport that the machine guns were not eligible for 
unrestricted private sale and that the machine guns could only be sold subject to certain 
federal restrictions. (R.37.) 
5. In response to the ATF's placement of restrictions upon the sale of 
the machine guns, Interport passed a Corporate Resolution to retain the services of Mr. 
Gardiner to represent it in litigation against the ATF to remove the restrictions. (R.40.) 
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6. The Corporate Resolution specifically indicated that Mr. Gardiner 
was to represent Interport. The Corporate Resolution stated as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED that Richard Gardiner be authorized 
to pursue the removal of the mentioned restrictions by negotiation 
and/or litigation with the [ATF] for and behalf of Interport, Inc. 
(14) 
7. Shortly thereafter, Interport and Mr. Gardiner entered into an oral 
agreement whereby Mr. Gardiner agreed to represent Interport, and Interport only, in a 
civil action against the United States in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia. (R.42.) 
8. Subsequently, Mr. Gardiner filed an action on behalf of Interport in 
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia captioned Interport, Inc. v. 
National Firearms Act Branch, Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, Civil Action 
No. 99-174 (SS) (the "District of Columbia lawsuit"). (R.2.) 
9. Mr. York was not a named party in the District of Columbia lawsuit 
and Mr. Gardiner did not represent Mr. York's individual interests in any way in that 
lawsuit. Interport was the only named plaintiff in the District of Columbia lawsuit and 
was the only party represented by Mr. Gardiner. (R.2; R.36; R.42.) 
10. During the course of the District of Columbia lawsuit, the ATF filed 
a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Interport's claims based on the six-
year statute of limitations applicable to claims against the United States as found in 28 
U.S.C. Section 2401. (R.37.) 
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11. On July 28, 1999, the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia granted the ATF's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Interport's 
claims. The court found that the action had not been commenced within the six-year 
statute of limitations. The court found that an ATF letter of October, 1986 put Interport 
on notice of any potential cause of action against the ATF and that the matter should have 
been commenced within six years of that date. (R.38.) 
12. Interport appealed the dismissal of the District of Columbia lawsuit 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. On December 
27, 1999, the Court of Appeals granted a motion for summary affirmance filed by the 
ATF and summarily affirmed the dismissal of Interport's claims in the District of 
Columbia lawsuit. (R.44.) 
13. On February 20, 2000, a substitution of counsel was filed with the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit substituting Lisa 
Freiman in place of Mr. Gardiner as counsel of record for Interport. (R.46.) 
B. THE UTAH FEDERAL COURT ACTION: 
14. On October 28, 1994, Interport submitted to the ATF an 
"Application and Permit for Importation of Firearms, Ammunition and Implements of 
War" (R.29-30.) 
15. On November 22, 1994, the ATF approved Interport's application 
and issued Permit No. 94-13811. The Permit indicated that "NO FIREARMS, 
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FRAMERS, RECEIVERS OR ACTIONS FOR FIREARMS ARE AUTHORIZED FOR 
IMPORTATION UNDER THE PERMIT." (R.29.) 
16. In January of 1995, 1,100 sets of AKM4 machine gun components 
were imported into the United States by Interport under Permit No. 94-13811. (See id.) 
17. When the 1,100 sets of machine gun components were received in 
Salt Lake City, they were inspected by the United States Customs Service ("Customs"). 
Customs requested an opinion from ATF as to whether the 1,100 sets of machine gun 
components qualified as "receivers"5 in violation of Permit No. 94-13811. (See id.) 
18. ATF provided an opinion to Customs that the 1,100 sets of machine 
gun components were in fact "receivers" in violation of Permit No. 94-13811. On 
January 30, 1995, Customs seized the 1,100 machine gun receivers as merchandise being 
introduced into the United States in violation of law. (See id.) 
19. On June 25, 1997 the United States commenced an in rem 
proceeding seeking forfeiture of the 1,100 machine gun receivers imported by Interport 
(hereinafter "Utah Federal Court lawsuit"). (R.48.) 
20. In July 1997, Interport and Mr. Gardiner entered into an oral 
agreement whereby Mr. Gardiner agreed to represent Interport as a claimant in the Utah 
Federal Court lawsuit. (R.42.) 
4
 The AKM is a variation of the Russian shoulder-mounted AK machine gun. 
5
 A receiver houses a gun's firing mechanism including the hammer, bolt and 
firing pin. 
9 
21. Mr. York was not a named party to the Utah Federal Court lawsuit 
and was not represented by Mr. Gardiner in any individual capacity. (R.4.) 
22. Mr. Gardiner represented Interport, and Interport only, in pretrial 
hearings and at a two-day bench trial held July 15-16, 1999. (R.4, 48.) 
23. On August 26, 1999, the Honorable Judge Tena Campbell entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and ordered that the 1,100 machine gun 
receivers be forfeited as Interport knowingly and willingly imported the receivers in 
violation of the Permit issued by the ATF. (R.33-34.) 
24. On October 12, 1999, the Honorable Judge Campbell ordered that 
"[a]ny and all right, title or interest of Interport [with respect to the 1,100 machine gun 
receivers] is forever barred . . .." (R.60.) 
25. Interport then proceeded to terminate its attorney-client relationship 
with Mr. Gardiner. (R.62.) For that reason, on November 9, 1999, Mr. Gardiner filed a 
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel from the Utah Federal Court lawsuit. (See id.; R.48.) 
Mr. Gardiner then ceased his representation of Interport in the Utah Federal Court 
lawsuit. (See id.) 
26. On April 12, 2005, Mr. York commenced this legal malpractice 
action on his own behalf against Mr. Gardiner. (R.6.) 
27. Mr. Gardiner filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on July 15, 
2005 on the issues of duty, standing and the four year statute of limitations. (R.7-63.) 
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28. The trial court held oral argument on the Motion for Summary 
Judgment on October 25, 2005. (R.126.) 
29. The trial court issued a Memorandum Decision granting Mr. 
Gardiner's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issues of duty and standing, but 
denying the motion as to the statute of limitations. (R.128.) 
30. On December 5, 2005, Mr. York filed a pleading entitled 
"Addendum To: Motion to Disqualify, Affidavit of Bias & Prejudice & Certificate of 
Good Faith" in which he argued, for a second time, for the recusal of Judge Eyre. 
(R.144.) 
31. On December 7, 2005, Judge Eyre ruled that while he "had 
previously thought he was not biased or prejudiced against the plaintiff, William York, 
given the very personal, mean spirited and false allegations made by the plaintiff in his 
recently filed Addendum, the Court believes that it can not now put aside those 
allegations and not be affected by what appears to be the personal animosity that Mr. 
York appears to have against the Court." (R.155.) The case was then transferred to the 
Honorable Judge Fred D. Howard on December 15, 2005. (R. 159.) 
32. On December 23, 2005, Mr. Gardiner filed a Motion to Reconsider 
and/or Clarify November 29, 2005 Memorandum Decision in which he asked the trial 
court to reconsider, inter alia, the ruling regarding the statute of limitations. (R.165.) 
33. Mr. York did not respond to the motion in any way and Mr. Gardiner 
filed a Request to Submit for Decision on January 19, 2006. (R.231.) 
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34. On February 16, 2006, the trial court entered a Ruling Re: 
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and/or Clarify in which it granted Mr. Gardiner 
summary judgment on the statute of limitations. (R.233.) 
35. An order entitled Judgment of Dismissal was submitted to the Court. 
The Court signed and filed the Judgment on March 14, 2006. (R.239-40.) 
36. On March 13, 2006, Mr. York filed a pleading entitled Request for 
Due Process & Constitutional Rights in which he argued that he should have been able to 
have a hearing on Mr. Gardiner's Motion to Reconsider and/or Clarify. (R.237.) 
37. Mr. York also filed a Motion for Default Judgment on March 13, 
2006 in which he argued that he was entitled to a default judgment because Mr. Gardiner 
had not filed an answer to his complaint. (R.242.) 
38. Mr. Gardiner responded to both of these motions, but they were 
never submitted to the trial court for decision and were therefore never ruled upon by the 
trial court. Mr. Gardiner then filed his Notice of Appeal on April 12, 2006. (R.266.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This Court should affirm the lower court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Mr. Gardiner because Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 did not toll the four year 
statute of limitations applicable to Mr. York's claim, including any claim assigned to Mr. 
York by Interport. Although § 78-12-35 does provide that the statute of limitations 
should be tolled when a defendant is out of state, the tolling statute does not apply so long 
as the defendant is still subject to personal jurisdiction within the state. Applying the 
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tolling statute to out-of-state defendants who remain amenable to service would frustrate 
the purpose of statutes of limitations by preserving claims indefinitely. Therefore, 
because Mr. Gardiner was amenable to service of process through Utah's long arm statute 
despite his absence from the state, the statute of limitations was not tolled. (R.234A.) 
Mr. York's claim, raised for the first time on appeal, that the four year statute 
of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 violates the open courts provision is 
also clearly erroneous. Courts have consistently held that the four year statute of 
limitations applicable to civil actions in Utah is constitutional. Furthermore, the statute 
was reasonable in its application to Mr. York because he was aware of his alleged injury 
at the time it occurred and had ample opportunity to bring his claim before its expiration. 
(R.4, 54-55.) 
Finally, Mr. York's "secondary" contentions, which have no affect on this 
appeal, also fail for the following reasons: (1) the record indicates he was sent copies of 
the court's Memorandum Decision which granted the motion for summary judgment and 
of the proposed Judgment of Dismissal, (R.241), and even if he was not, he suffered no 
prejudice; (2) Mr. York has had the same access to the case file as has Mr. Gardiner, 
which has been sufficient; (3) Mr. York was not entitled to a hearing on Mr. Gardiner's 
Motion to Reconsider and/or Clarify because the issue had already been authoritatively 
decided by the Utah Supreme Court, (R.233-34A), and in any event, he failed to request 
such a hearing; (R.233); and (4) Mr. York was not entitled to a hearing or decision on his 
13 
pending motions because they were improper and he failed to submit them to the court for 
decision. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT U.C.A. 
SECTION 78-12-35 DID NOT TOLL THE FOUR YEAR 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WHERE MR. GARDINER 
WAS AT ALL TIMES AMENABLE TO PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION WITHIN THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Appellee Richard Gardiner respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
lower court's grant of summary judgment because Judge Howard correctly held that Utah 
Code Ann. Section 78-12-35 did not toll the four year statute of limitations.6 
Section 78-12-35 states that if a person departs from the state after a cause of 
action has accrued against him, "the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for 
the commencement of the action." However, under Utah law, the statute of limitations 
will not be tolled even when a defendant is out-of-state, so long as he is still amenable to 
personal jurisdiction within Utah. See Lund v. Hall 938 P.2d 285, 290 (Utah 1997). To 
hold otherwise would lead to the indefinite delay of claims and would frustrate the very 
purpose of statutes of limitations. As such, because Mr. Gardiner remained amenable to 
6
 Mr. Gardiner notes that Mr. York's brief is deficient under Utah R. App. P. 24 in 
that it fails to set forth the appropriate standard of review; sets forth little legal analysis on 
the issues; contains a Summary of Arguments section but is entirely devoid of an 
Arguments section; and fails to cite to the record or to legal authority in support of the 
arguments. As such, Mr. York has inadequately briefed the issues he raised and this 
Court may decline to consider his arguments. See Spencer v. Pleasant View City, 2003 
UT App 379, fpO-21, 80 P.3d 546; State ex rel C.Y. v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1992). 
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personal jurisdiction through Utah's long-arm statute after he left Utah, the trial court 
correctly found that the statute of limitations was not tolled. 
In Lund, a plaintiff injured in a car accident filed a complaint against the 
defendant more than four years after the accident. 938 P.2d at 286. The plaintiff asserted 
that the four year statute of limitations applicable to her claim should be tolled under 
Section 78-12-35 because the defendant had been out of state during the four years prior 
to her complaint. See id. at 287. In affirming the trial court's denial of plaintiff s motion 
to reconsider the summary judgment granted in favor of the defendant, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that "under section 78-12-35, the statute of limitations will not be tolled when 
a defendant is out of state, as long as he is still amenable to service of process in the state 
of Utah." Id at 290. Indeed, the plaintiff had alleged in her complaint that the defendant 
was "at all times pertinent herein" a resident of Utah. IdL at 291. The court also noted 
that its holding was consistent with the majority of states which take the position "that 
the statute of limitations will not be tolled against a defendant who leaves the state after 
the cause of action arose but who is still amenable to process within the state." Id. at 290. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Utah Supreme Court discussed several other 
cases involving the tolling issue including Van Tassell v. Shaffer, 742 P.2d 111 (Utah 
App. 1997). In Van Tassell this Court followed precedent set by three earlier Utah cases 
and affirmed the trial court's application of the tolling provision to a defendant outside 
the state of Utah, despite the fact that the defendant maintained a residence in the state. 
However, in so doing this Court observed "that the majority view, which holds that 
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defendant's absence does not toll the statute of limitations where defendant is amenable 
to personal jurisdiction, would be preferred by this Court as the Utah law, as we find it to 
be more consistent with the purposes of statutes of limitations." Id. at 113 (emphasis 
added). The Utah Supreme Court later agreed that the majority view was the correct 
interpretation. See Lund, 938 P.2d at 290. 
One of the out-of-state majority cases adhering to this same view, cited with 
approval by the court in Lund, is Lipe v. Javelin Tire Co., 536 P.2d 291 (Idaho 1975). 
The Idaho Supreme Court's reasoning and holding is directly applicable to the instant 
case. 
The plaintiff in Lipe filed an action against Javelin Tire Company ("Javelin") 
after the two year statute of limitations had expired. Javelin was a foreign corporation 
doing business in Idaho. The plaintiff argued that the out-of-state tolling statute applied 
to toll the running of the statute of limitations because Javelin was a foreign corporation. 
The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the statute was not tolled 
because, pursuant to Idaho's long-arm statute, Javelin was amenable to jurisdiction in the 
State of Idaho and subject to service of process in pursuit of that jurisdiction. In reaching 
its conclusion, the Lipe court cited Fullmer v. Sloan's Sporting Goods, Co., 277 F. Supp. 
995 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), which said: 
[T]he defendant [a New York corporation] was never physically 
present in Idaho, its only presence being that it was subject to service under 
the Idaho long arm statute in an action commenced in that state. To apply 
the Idaho tolling provisions to the defendant would be to reach the absurd 
conclusion that the statute of limitations would never run. Such a 
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conclusion was rejected by the Supreme Court of Arizona in Phillips v. 
Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966). Arizona 
has a tolling provision similar to that in Idaho. In Phillips, the court held: 
For a foreign corporation to be "without the state" or 
"absent" within the meaning of a statute providing for the 
tolling of limitations during the absence of a defendant, it 
must be out of the state in the sense that it could not be served 
with process. (Citations omitted). Since we haive held that 
defendant can be properly served, the statute of limitations is 
not tolled. (413 P.2d at 738, 739) 277 F. Supp. at 998. 
Lipe, 536 P.2d at 293-94 (emphasis added). 
The fact that the Utah Supreme Court in Lund cited Lipe with approval is a strong 
indication that it did not intend to limit its holding to circumstances where an out-of-state 
defendant is physically subject to service within Utah's geographical borders. Rather, the 
defendant need only be "in the state" in the sense that he or she is amenable to service of 
process even though not physically within the State of Utah. 
The policy behind this application of Section 78-12-35 was summarized by the 
Lund court as follows: 
Interpreting section 78-12-35 as tolling the statute of limitations regardless 
of whether defendant remained amenable to service of process could lead to 
claims being filed many years after the cause of action arose and would be 
contrary to the rationale behind the statutes of limitations. Furthermore, 
applying the tolling provision in all cases would result in extensive 
discovery inquiring as to each and every day that a defendant was out of 
state for personal or business reasons. 
938P.2dat291. 
Just as the statute of limitations applicable in Lund was not tolled because the 
defendant remained amenable to service despite his absence from the state, the statute of 
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limitations should not be tolled in the instant case because Mr. Gardiner was amenable to 
service despite his absence from Utah. Furthermore, as in Lipe, it is irrelevant that Mr. 
Gardiner may not have been available for service within the geographical boundaries of 
Utah because Utah's long-arm statute provided a means of obtaining personal jurisdiction 
over him and he therefore was subject to service of process. (R.234A.) In light of Lund, 
and Van Tassell this is also clearly the interpretation accepted in Utah. 
By Mr. York's own assertions, Mr. Gardiner was amenable to service of process 
while he was out of the State because of the long-arm statute's jurisdictional scope and 
also because York knew where Mr. Gardiner resided and could be served. Specifically, 
Mr. York claimed in his Response to Motion for Summary Judgment that the trial court 
had personal jurisdiction over Mr. Gardiner pursuant to Utah's long-arm statute, Utah 
Code Ann. Sections 78-27-22 et. seq., based on the legal representation provided by Mr. 
Gardiner as counsel for Interport in the Utah litigation. (R.86-87.) 
Policy considerations clearly weigh against adopting Mr. York's position. As 
indicated by Judge Howard in his Ruling Re: Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and/or 
Clarify, "[t]olling the statute of limitations regardless of whether Mr. Gardner was subject 
to the personal jurisdiction of Utah courts through Utah's long-arm statute would 
effectively nullify the statute of limitations . . . ." (R.234A.) Indeed, as noted in Fullmer, 
tolling the statute of limitations despite the fact that a defendant is subject to service 
under a long arm statute would result in "the absurd conclusion that the statute of 
limitations would never run." This is also precisely the concern cited by the Utah 
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Supreme Court in Lund when it stated that applying the tolling statute to defendants 
despite their amenability to service "could lead to claims being filed many years after the 
cause of action arose and would be contrary to the rationale behind the statutes of 
limitations." Such would be the result if Mr. York's position were adopted. 
Although Mr. Gardiner was not physically present in the State of Utah during 
much of the statute of limitations period applicable to this case, he was subject to service 
through Utah's long-arm statute that entire time. As such, under Utah law, the trial court 
correctly found that the statute of limitations was not tolled under Section 78-12-35. 
II. THE FOUR YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EMBODIED 
IN U.C.A. SECTION 78-12-25 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE OPEN 
COURTS PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The four year statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-25 
does not violate the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution because it provided 
Mr. York with a reasonable period of time in which to bring suit. 
Mr. York has alleged that the statute of limitations applicable to this case is 
unconstitutional because it puts a time limit bar on civil actions. He raises this argument 
under UTAH CONST. Art. I, § 11, also known as the open courts provision. Although Mr. 
York has improperly raised this argument for the first time on appeal justifying its 
rejection on that basis alone, Mr. Gardiner will nevertheless explain why the argument 
has no substantive merit. 
A statute of limitations " ;is constitutionally sound if it should allow a reasonable, 
not unlimited, time in which to bring suit.5" Avis v. Bd. of Review of the Indus. Comm'n, 
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837 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing McHenrv v. Utah Valley Hosp., 724 F. 
Supp. 835, 837 (D. Utah 1989)). What amounts to a reasonable time is decided by the 
state's legislature and, therefore, state statutes of limitations "are presumptively 
constitutional." Avis, 837 P.2d at 587. Utah's four year statute of limitations applicable 
to civil actions has been consistently upheld as constitutional. See id., at 588; McHenrv, 
724 F. Supp. at 837. In fact, at least one court has imposed sanctions against a party for 
arguing that such a statute was unconstitutional because the argument "was not warranted 
by existing law." McHenrv v. Utah Valley Hosp., 927 F.2d 1125 (10th Cir. 1991). 
Although "[c]ourts have recognized exceptions to alleviate the harsh effects of 
statutes of limitations", those "exceptions involve cases where 'plaintiff[s] had no way of 
knowing the injury had occurred until after the statute had run . . . .'" Avis, 837 P.2d at 
587 (quoting McHenrv, 724 F. Supp. at 839.) Furthermore, a court need not even inquire 
into the propriety of the limitations period if it was reasonable as applied to the particular 
plaintiff. See Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City. 104 P.3d 646, %il 
(Utah App. 2004) (declining to inquire into the wisdom of various limitation periods 
applicable to the plaintiffs because they were aware of their injury during those periods 
and could have brought suit before their expiration). 
The four year statute of limitations applicable to Mr. York's claim is not 
unconstitutional as a violation of Utah's open courts provision. As discussed above, this 
statute has previously been upheld and, as noted in McHenrv, a challenge to such a statute 
is "not warranted by existing law." 
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Furthermore, the statute was clearly reasonable with regard to Mr. York's 
situation, as he was aware of his injury well before the expiration of the statute of 
limitations. Mr. York cannot assert that he did not know about the claimed cause of 
action against Mr. Gardiner as Mr. York was involved as the corporate representative in 
all of the acts complained of in the Complaint. For example, Mr. York indicates in his 
Complaint that he attended the bench trial which he claims was not properly handled by 
Gardiner. (R.4.) Moreover, after Mr. Gardiner withdrew as counsel in the Utah Federal 
Court lawsuit, Mr. York began filing various motions and requests with the court as early 
as December 13, 1999. (R.54-55.) Interport filed appeals in both the District of 
Columbia lawsuit and the Utah Federal Court lawsuit, both of which were dismissed. 
(R.44, 54.) It is therefore very clear from the record that Mr. York and Interport knew of 
the adverse decisions in the District of Columbia and Utah Federal Court lawsuits as soon 
as they happened. 
The four year statute of limitations applicable to Mr. York's claim has been upheld 
as valid under the Utah Constitution. Furthermore, the statute as it applies to Mr. York's 
situation allowed him a reasonable time to respond because he was aware of his alleged 
injury at the time it occurred. As such, the statute of limitations set forth in Section 78-
12-25 does not violate the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution. 
III. MR. YORK WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS WITH 
RESPECT TO NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD IN 
THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
In the addendum to his opening brief, Mr. York listed several "issues for 
secondary review" that he requested this Court to address. Mr. York asserts that he was 
denied due process with regard to each of the following issues: (1) the alleged failure of 
Judge Eyre and Judge Howard to send him a copy of their final orders; (2) the alleged 
failure of Judge Howard to make his case file available; (3) the dismissal of his case 
without a hearing; and (4) the dismissal of his case without ruling on his pending motions. 
None of these issues should affect this appeal, which solely concerns the statute of 
limitations issue that was the source of the trial court's ruling. Nevertheless, Mr. 
Gardiner will address each of Mr. York's "secondary" contentions in turn. 
A. The Record Indicates A Copy Of The Trial Court's Final Order 
Was Mailed to Mr. York And, In Any Event, Mr. York Incurred No 
Prejudice. 
Mr. York asserts he was not sent copies of the final orders of Judge Eyre or Judge 
Howard and claims such failures were intentional. See Opening Br. of Appellant, pp. 8-9. 
He even goes so far as to allege that Judge Howard's failure to provide a copy of his final 
order was "an underhanded attempt" at causing Mr. York to miss the deadline for filing 
his notice of appeal. 
However, the record indicates that on December 1, 2005, Mr. York was mailed a 
copy of Judge Eyre's Memorandum Decision, dated November 29, 2005. (R.143.) On 
February 16, 2006, a copy of Judge Howard's Ruling Re: Defendant's Motion to 
Reconsider and/or Clarify was mailed to Mr. York. (R.233-37.) And on February 27, 
2006, Mr. York was sent copy of the proposed Judgment of Dismissal which Judge 
Howard signed on March 14, 2006. (R.239-41.) As such, it appears as though Mr. York 
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should have received copies of these orders and it is certain that neither judge 
intentionally decided not to provide Mr. York with a copy. 
Furthermore, even if Mr. York had not been provided a copy of Judge Howard's 
final order, he has suffered no prejudice. He complains that this failure could have 
caused him to miss the appeal deadline, but Mr. York obviously did not miss that 
deadline. As such, Mr. York has incurred no harm and therefore is not entitled to a 
remedy. 
B. Mr. York Has Had Equal Access To The Record. 
Mr. York has also charged Judge Howard with secreting the case file from him 
since last December, when he was assigned the case. See Opening Br. of Appellant, pp. 
9-10. It is difficult to determine what Mr. York is alleging with regard to this issue, or 
how it affects this appeal. He repeats his claim that he was not able to see the final order 
which he is appealing, but as was discussed in the previous section, the record indicates 
he was sent a copy. He has also cited Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-
205(3), which pertains to the security of court records. This rule states that "[cjourt 
records shall not be removed from the courthouse without permission of the court" and 
that records which are removed "shall be returned within two days " This rule does 
not seem to support Mr. York's argument. Moreover, access to the record has obviously 
been sufficient for Mr. York to pursue his appeal. 
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C. Mr, York Failed To Oppose Mr. Gardiner's Motion To Reconsider 
And Clarify And Failed to Request A Hearing And Therefore Cannot 
Complain That He Did Not Get A Hearing. 
Mr. York also did not suffer any constitutional injury with respect to the fact that 
he was not afforded the opportunity to present his arguments in opposition to Mr. 
Gardiner's Motion to Reconsider and/or Clarify at a hearing. Under Rule 7(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, a party is not entitled to a hearing on a dispositive motion, even 
if oral argument is requested, if the court finds that the issue has been authoritatively 
decided. In ruling on Mr. Gardiner's Motion, Judge Howard held that the issue of 
whether the statute of limitations should be tolled had already been authoritatively 
decided by the Utah Supreme Court. (R.233-34A.) As such, no hearing was required. 
Furthermore, Mr. York failed to file any response to said motion and likewise did 
not request a hearing. (R.233.) Therefore, he cannot now argue that the court denied him 
an opportunity to present his argument because he is solely responsible for missing that 
opportunity. 
D. Mr. York's Three Subsequent Motions Were Not Proper Under 
The Rules And Were Never Submitted To The Court For Decision 
Before Dismissal Of The Case. 
Finally, Mr. York alleges that his rights have been violated because he has filed 
three motions which were not scheduled for hearings or decided by the trial court. (See 
App. Br. p. 10.) As with Mr. York's other "secondary issues," this argument has no 
effect upon this appeal. Furthermore, it is clear that Mr. York was not entitled to a 
hearing or decision on any of those motions. 
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Each of the three motions was improper under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
for various reasons. For example, the motions were not accompanied by memoranda, as 
required by Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c). (R.64-65; 237-38; 242-43.) Furthermore, two of those 
motions, the Request For Due Process & Constitutional Rights and Motion for Default 
Judgment, were filed after Judge Howard ruled on Mr. Gardiner's Motion to Reconsider 
and/or Clarify. (R.233-35.) Mr. York's motions were not objections to the form of the 
Judgment of Dismissal submitted by Mr. Gardiner's counsel as allowed under Rule 
7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. There being no objections to the form, the 
court properly signed the Judgment of Dismissal on March 14, 2006. Consequently, not 
only were both of Mr. York's motions improper, they were also untimely. 
Not only were those three motions improper, they were without merit. Plaintiffs 
Motion to Intervene requested that he be allowed to intervene as a joint defendant in a 
case separate from the one before the trial court. As such, the Motion was filed in the 
wrong case. (R.104.) As discussed above, the Request For Due Process & Constitutional 
Rights lacked merit because no hearing was required inasmuch as the issue had been 
authoritatively decided and Plaintiff had not even responded or asked for a hearing on the 
matter. And finally, the Motion for Default Judgment was off-base because Defendant 
was not required to file an answer where he filed a successful Motion for Summary 
Judgment in response to Plaintiffs Complaint. (R.248-55.) 
In addition, Utah R. Civ. P. 7(d) establishes that after the briefing on a motion has 
been completed, either party may file a "Request to Submit for Decision." "If no party 
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files a request, the motion will not be submitted for decision." Id Mr. Gardiner filed a 
response to each of Mr. York's three motions. (R.104, 248, 257.) Thus, even if Mr. York 
were entitled to a hearing or decision on his three motions, which he was not, he never 
followed the proper procedure under Rule 7 and filed a Request to Submit for Decision. 
Instead, he filed his notice of appeal. He cannot now complaint that the trial court did not 
hold a hearing or render decisions on motions which he never submitted for decision. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should hold that the trial court correctly 
granted Mr. Gardiner's Motion for Summary Judgment when it found that Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-35 did not toll the four year statute of limitations applicable in this case. 
The Court should reject all of Mr. York's ''secondary issues" as well. 
DATED this _S_ day of September, 2006. 
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